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Introduction 
Security as an objectively existing quality (Manners, 2002: 19; Waissová, 2005: 8) which can 
be discussed in innumerable ways, but it may hardly be ignored and its significance (let alone 
its existence) may hardly be doubted. Security is a fundamental human need which is a 
subject of our efforts for its satisfaction and its chronic deficiency leads to frustration. 
Considering the differing views on how the term “security” itself should be defined and what 
specific aspects or issues it should include (and which ones it should not), there can be no 
doubt that virtually no area of human activity can manage without holding an opinion on 
security issues. Security is not a mere construct inferred from academic debates. Nothing 
can change this despite the fact that this phenomenon has become an overused topic of 
societal debates, election campaigns and media (virtual) reality. Presence or absence of 
danger (in/security, un/certainty) can be described in so many forms, that are not easy to be 
transparently arranged or even mathematized (Manners, 2002: 21; Waissová, 2005: 7). It is 
in fact necessary to give up the quest for the objective truth, because of the fact, that the 
security disciplines are very subjective per se. Security is an omnipresent phenomenon and 
it is difficult to choose the best concept for a security research for this reason, although 
many authors are insisting on their concept being the best one, e.g. Buzan et al (1998). This 
paper deals with these matters presenting an academic concept of in/security in the context 
of a revise of the security agenda of the European Union (e.g. with regard to the Directive of 
the Council on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection (COM(2006)787)). 
 
1 A concept of in/security 
The security is a changeable phenomenon which can be seen from many points of view 
therefore the security research is using a security concept only. As such, it is usually tailored 
for the purpose of a paper, book, etc. The in/security is a social phenomenon which can be 
reflected by language. We tried to apply a linguistic approach to explain the in/security 
phenomenon in European culture context. We have chosen some words referring to 
in/security phenomenon and we have been looking for their etymology of non‐Slavic 
(English, German) and Slavic (Russian, Czech) languages. These words are: in/security, 
un/safety as terms for conditions of in/security; risk, danger/dangerous, threat as terms for 
describing the level of in/security; stability, certainty, turbulent, hazard/jeopardy as terms 
for describing the dynamics of in/security. Security and safety are abstract nouns derived from adjectives secure and safe. Safe meant 
free from hurt or damage in the 13th century, and in 14th century it meant free from danger, 
secure. In medieval English safe was sauf, sāf, originally inflected sauve, save from (old) 
French sauf (Anglo‐Norman saf) having the same meaning as Italian salvo originated in Latin 
salvu‐s = uninjured, entire, healthy. Secure means sure, safe. Secure was used since the 14th 
century as word meaning trustworthy, steadfast, subjectively certain; since the 15th century 
secure meant objective certain furthermore. The origin of the word secure is in the Italian 
siero originated in Latin sē/cūrus = careless,  without suffering. (Onions et al, 1966) The 
etymology of German die Sicherheit, containing the adjective sicher and the suffix –heit, is 
derived from Latin word sēcūru, as well. (Kluge, Seebold, 2002) Morphologically similar 
words for the English word security are in the Slavic languages: безопасноcть [bezopasnost] 
(Czernyj, 1993) and bezpečnost [bezpecznost] (Rejzek, 2001). Both words contain the same 
suffix  без‐/bez‐ = without, and the same suffix ‐ocть/‐ost using for words meaning 
situations, outcomes or characteristics. (Petr et al: 296‐297) The base of the Russian word 
без/опасн/оcть [bezopasnost] is the noun опасение [opasenije] = fear, distress. The base of 
the Czech word bez/pečn/ost is the noun péče [pecze] = care. Obviously the Czech word 
bezpečnost  is a calque of the Latin word sēcūrus having the meaning in Czech being without 
suffering, or fear (of future). The meaning of the Russian word безопасноcть and its relation 
to Latin sēcūrus is much more disguised than it is in the case of the Czech word bezpečnost. 
The word опасение is related to the verb пасти [pasti] = graze. The origin of this word is in 
the Latin word pāscō = feed, graze, and in the Latin word pānis = bread. (Czernyj, 1993) In 
this point of view, безопасноcть means being careless for bread, being not obligated take 
care so closely for being alive. 
The word risk means chance or peril of destruction or loss. The origin of this word has been 
derived from French word risqué, Italian risco, rischio. Italian rischiare, risicare means run 
into danger. (Onions et al, 1966) For risk we are using das Risiko in German. The etymology 
of this word refers to the Spanish word risco meaning reaf, rock, or submerged rocks. A 
phenomenon determined as a risk means that our plans can fall through this 
phenomenon. The Germen etymology dictionary (Kluge, Seebold, 2002) refers to a similar 
origin as the English risk. This origin should be derived from Romaic *rixicare and Latin rixāri 
meaning fight. The same meaning have the Czech riziko and Russian риск [risk] springing 
from the German word das Risiko. (Rejzek, 2001; Czernyj, 1993) If we find a phenomenon as 
a risk, we could be ready for fighting with this phenomenon in the future. This phenomenon 
can be dangerous; it can evolve from a risk to a danger. 
The original word meaning of danger was power of a master, dominion, hesitation. – To be 
dangerous means fraught of danger, to have a potential for inflicting injury to someone. The 
English word da(u)nger is borrowed from the old French word dangier. It has its origin in 
Romaic  *domniārium, formed on domnus,  diminus meaning lord,  master. (Onions et al, 
1966) The German has the word das Gefahr for danger. This word originated from medieval 
German  gevāre = trick,  delusion and old German word fāra, or old Saxon fār meaning 
snooping, nosiness, trailing. The potential origin of these words is the Germanic word *færo 
= snooping or old Nordic fār = hostility, illusion. (Kluge, Seebold, 2002) Slavic languages form 
the meaning of danger in another way; danger is a direct opposite to security/safety. A 
danger in Russian is опасноть, (Czernyj, 1993) and in Czech is nebezpečí. (Rejzek, 2001), 
which has been formed as opposites to  безопасноcть, and bezpečnost. Not to be 
secure/safe is expressed in Russian находиться в опасноти [nachoditsja v opasnosti], and in Czech být v nebezpečí [beet v nebezpeczi]. Regardless of it, there is an extra level in Russian 
and Czech for it, what English means under the term to be in danger, or German means 
under in Gefahr sein. Russians say: находящийся  под  угрозой  [nachodjajshisja pod 
ugrozoj], (Melnikov et al, 1982) and the Czechs: být ohrožen [beet ohrozen], it means both 
nations will have to fight the phenomenon/risk, if it is felt as угроза [ugroza], hrozba or 
ohrožení [ohrozeni] which origin is in *groza = thunderstorm and onomatopoeic describing 
the voice of thunder. (Rejzek, 2001) It is (potentially) dangerous, when we hear the voice of 
thunder, when a storm is beginning, or when it is getting closer to thunder, when we have a 
clear evidence of dangerousness of a phenomenon with potential to harm our lives.  
In the old English, threat had those meanings: throng, troop, oppression, and affliction. One 
of old‐English meanings was denunciation of evil to come. Probably the word threat is 
cognate with Latin word trūdere = thrust. (Onions et al, 1966) To feel in danger, it was for 
Slavic’s sufficient to hear thunderstorm. It was not adequate for Anglo‐Saxons; they felt in 
danger, if they were waiting for trouble, a kind of instability. Trouble meant mental distress 
formerly (in 13
th century); than the meaning shifted to public distress, pains, exertion. The 
word trouble origins from old French truble, turble, tourble, derived probably from Romaic 
verb *turbulāre, or the feminine noun *turbulus, or Latin noun turbidus meant disturbed, 
turbid. (Onions et al, 1966) To be in trouble, to be in a turbulent, uncertain environment is a 
peril, because we cannot foresee outcomes of our behaviour in this environment. A peril is 
an experiment literally, because this word originated from Latin perīc(u)lum = experiment. 
(Onions et al, 1966) To be in danger, means to be exposed to instability, to phenomenon’s 
eroding status quo.  
The word stability appeared in 15
th century as stablete derived from old French (e)stableté 
with etymology from Latin words stabilitās = constancy,  stabilēre = to secure,  stabilis = 
settled, on which French stabilité and English stabilitie/y were directly modelled. (Onions et 
al, 1966) The same etymology has the German verb stabilisieren, noun die Stabilität, and 
adjective stabil derived from Latin stabilis, an adjective of eventuality to Latin stāre (statum) 
= to stand, to stop, to stay. (Kluge, Seebold, 2002) The same etymology has the Czech word 
stabilita, too, (Rejzek, 2001) in Russian another word was rather used than стабильность 
[stabilnost]. It is устойчивость [ustojczivost], or устойчивый [ustojczivyj], but these words 
were derived from verb стоять [stojat] = to stand, to stay. (Czernyj, 1993) If something is 
stabile, e.g. a phenomenon causing in/security, there are conditions of certainty. The noun 
certainty is derived from adjective certain, an old French word certain originated from 
Romance *cert￿nus, or Latin word certus = settled, sure, a formation on cernere = sift, 
separate, decide, decree related to Greeks krΐnein = separate,  kritós = chosen,  choice. 
(Onions et al, 1966) Fest has the similar meaning in German like the English word certain. Its 
etymology is unclear. Maybe, the word could be based on Fuß = foot in meaning foundation, 
something sure, fixed, settled. (Kluge, Seebold, 2002) In Russian adjective уверенний 
[uverenij], and noun уверенность [uverenost] are usually used. Both words are based on 
noun верa [vera] = belief. Our уверенность [uverenost], steadfastness in development of 
our environs, is based on our belief, trust, that circumstances will not be changed 
dramatically. (Czernyj, 1993) In Czech adjective jistý is used for something, what is certain, 
and from this word derived jistota = certainty, or adjective určitý [urczity], and from this 
adjective derived noun určitost [urczitost] = certainty. Jistý might be originated from the pre‐
Slavonic *istъ = real, or from the old Indian īśe = he owns. Určitý is based on verb určit, old 
Czech u/říci = say, actually, possibly named, because of its stability. (Rejzek, 2001)  The opposite to certain is uncertain, or put another way, turbulent. As already mentioned, 
turbulent means threatfull, actually. Our certainty, our stance on a floor is not stabile under 
turbulence circumstances. Die Turbulenzen causes in German our Unsicherheit, our 
uncertainty. They express the potential harming of our security. A traditional Czech opposite 
to jistý, or určitý is nejistý and neurčitý meaning uncertain, with difficulties regarded as 
constant, also worth of a name. The similar meaning has  the Russian adjective 
неустойчивый, an opposite to устойчивый. Going to uncertainty was considered for 
hazard, for game at dice originally in 13
th century, a game about our future with the destiny. 
In reality, hazard originated from azzahr,  azzār = gamming. (Onions et al, 1966) Verbs 
riskieren in German, риск [risk] in Russian, and riskovat in Czech have the same meaning – 
to steak something, to do something dangerous. There is yet another word in English 
describing the state of uncertainty. It is jeopardy, meaning a chess problem early, now risk 
of injury or death. Jeopardy is an adoption of an old English iu (ieu, giu) parti = a divided 
game, even game, uncertain chance. The old English iu parti is based on medieval Latin jocus 
partītus (iocus partītus); iocus = joke, game, amusement, partītus is past participle of partīrī 
= divide. (Onions et al, 1966)  
The linguistic approach to in/security as a cultural phenomenon shows us that there is a 
generous linguistic consensus. A describing of a situation of in/security can be based on the 
terms of similar etymology and similar meaning. As a consequence of this cultural unity, it is 
supposable that a concept for describing of in/security can be based on this terminology 
minimum. (see fig. 1) Because of the changeability of in/security this concept is not static. A 
mobile risk and a mobile subject that are taking care for its security can get closer to each 
other. Any security environment can be described by risks. The subject has a security policy 
which is based on two options for its security decision making. The subject can either avoid 
risk or fight risk to get more security or vice versa get less in/security. Avoiding risk (getting 
out strategy) and fighting risk (fighting risk strategy) are two basic options for a security 
policy of a subject. A level of in/security is measurable by probability of injury or harm of the 
subject. To have an affable probability of injury or harm of the subject is a goal of security 
policy. 
 
Fig. 1 A concept of description of in/security  
 
 
















A subject can specify a security policy in case it is able to monitor risks (e.g. intelligence data 
are needed), to guard itself from its boundary of security. An expansion of this boundary is 
usually demanded in order to feel safe. It can happen by technology (see fig. 2) or as a placebo‐effect inducted by ideologies, religion or religious beliefs. We refuse this approach 
and we assume that there is only a “feeling of being safe” based on knowledge of the injury, 
harm, or damage probability to a subject. If this probability is under ½, the subject can be 
sure that it will not be injured, harmed or damaged by a risk. It is in an out of danger 
area/environment, in a space, where it can generally feel sure. Over the ½ worth of 
probability the opposite can happen. Subject cannot be sure, that it will not incur any injury. 
But the subject can take an acceptable risk and even in an area/environment of acceptable 
risk its position can be stabile. So there is an area/environment of stability divided into an 
out of danger area and an area of acceptable risk. The subject is in danger if its probability of 
injury or harm will get over the area/environment of acceptable risk. Dwelling in a danger 
area/environment is considered hazardous, because a subject can incur injuries, destroying 
it completely. It can happen especially in a peril area/environment. 
What is worth the probability of injury or harm for an area/environment of acceptable risk, 
an area/environment of stability, a danger area/environment or a peril area/environment 
depends on the kind of a risk and on the kind of a subject. A natural disaster as a risk is able 
to impact on men/women, a family, a village, a city or a state as subjects and it can affect 
their lives significantly. But each of them will have another probability of injury or harm. 
Each subject has a different circle of security but the same security policy goal, which we 
have called as a feeling safe. This goal of a reasonable security policy is not to permit any 
diminishing of that boundary of security; vice versa this circle of security should expand, the 
area/environment of stability of the subject should expand. An expansion of this 
area/environment can happen in two ways: (a) the subject can fight or annihilate risks; (b) 
the subject can try to enlarge its area of acceptable risk. A combination of both ways is also 
possible. A strategy of fighting or annihilating risks is a proactive security strategy. The other 
strategy is a strategy of adjustments to risks. Which one is the best suitable strategy for 
achieving the goals of a security policy depends on the security environment, e.g. a subject 
living in Japan would not be afraid of an earthquake. Such risk cannot be fought by a subject 
living in Japan that has to accept this kind of risk if he/she wants to live there. On the other 
hand, living in the world where a man/woman can die of infectious diseases a proactive 
strategy focused on fighting these diseases, e.g. by vaccination, sanitation, or separating of 
infectors, is a good part of good security policy.  
Gaining of information about risks, their hazard areas, and their impacts on the subject can 
break the uncertainty of the subject. This kind of intelligence is a precondition for  an 
expansion of area/environment of stability of the subject. Such proper pieces of information 
about risks are needed for an effective and rational guarding of the subject. According to 
limiting of human senses it is necessary to gain proper information and to make a rational 
decision that will increase the security of the subject, e.g. if the thunderstorm is a risk and a 
lightning is able to injure the subject, it makes no sense to light a Candlemas candle, 
although it has been observed many times that this candle flame is “a good safeguard” 
against a lighting. Lighting never strokes twice at the same place but the best solution of this 
problem is an installation of lightning conductors. The safety precautions such as the 
installing of lighting conductors can be seen as a good example of guarding by a subject 
against the risk that we are not able to fight. This installing of lighting conductors is caused 
by an expansion of boundary of security. The subject is feeling more secure; the installation 
of lighting conductors is obviously independent on her/his belief in the power of Candlemas 
candles. 2 A Candlemas candle effect and the European security agenda 
It seems that a security environment can be very complex and it is able to change very 
quickly. A tangible evidence of it is the change of security environment after the 9/11 attack 
on the WTC in the U.S. Threats and risks determine the security environment of a subject, a 
player (actor) choosing his/her security options to achieve goals of his/her security policy. 
The subjects and the risks/threats can be seen as variables of any security policy analyses. 
Players and risks/threats are a variable part of security environment. They are usually 
systematized by authors to highlight the causality of an effect of threats on the behaviour of 
subjects and their reaction relating to this effect. Such situation causes a kind of entropy, 
where there are many risks/threats and many subjects potentially interacting with each 
risk/threats. Preferring the institutional aspect, the subjects of a security policy can be 
systemized according to taxonomy of Buzan et al (1998: 2001) e.g. into following system 
units: 
•  Individual (resident, inhabitant, citizen, immigrant, tourist etc.), family; 
•  association of the citizens; non‐governmental organisation (local, nation‐wide, 
internationally operating, activity type‐based); 
•  private company (small enterprise, larger company, supra‐national business entity, state 
holding company); 
•  association of the private firms (representing, for example, one sector of industry); 
•  community (small municipality, union of municipalities, large municipality – nation 
capital, conurbation); 
•  region (union of municipalities, self‐governing territorial units, region level according to 
NUTS classification); 
•  state (including the security priorities of particular countries holding the Presidency); 
•  supra‐state structure (international organisation, European Union); 
•  entire world (global international community). 
Each of these units is able to affect these risks/threats of which systematization can be very 
extensive. Just natural disasters can be systemized in compliance with the World Bank (Dilley 
et al, 2005: 25‐27) into 9 groups: drought, storms, floods, earthquakes, volcanoes, extreme 
temperature, landslides, wave/surge, and wildfires. But besides natural disasters there are: 
manmade non‐intentional disasters; manmade intentional disasters (including terrorism, 
sabotage, impact of organised crime etc.). Literature is usually blind to this entropy focusing 
on analysing aspects of a “universal” security environment. It is a pity because a security 
policy written into a strategic document is not an academic matter but a matter of our 
current life. Security should be accountable if we take into account that a government is 
responsible for security of a state, citizens, etc. The European security agenda must not 
become a Candlemas candle. There is not a security without plausibility of the security 
policy. But our belief in our governments or in the European Commission will not bring more 
security. To avoid the Candlemas candle effect we should pay closer attention to the 
practical aspects of security policy. In this context, it is worth of mentioning, e.g., the 
Directive of the Council on the identification and designation of European Critical 
Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (COM(2006)787 
final) of 12th December 2006. The directive defines four categories of potential adversary 
effects to society. These can be used to define a minimum societal consequence that the failure of an infrastructure must have, before being classified as European Sceptic. The four 
categories of criteria identified by the directive are (Thorton, 2008): 
•  Potential to cause casualties and public health consequences (an estimate of the number 
of deaths or seriously injured), due to the destruction or disruption of an infrastructure. 
•  Economic effects (significance of economic loss and/or degradation of products or 
services). In effect, an estimate of the economic loss caused by destruction or disruption 
of infrastructure in any of the impacted Member States. 
•  Public effects (number of members of the population affected including the effects on 
public confidence, psychosocial impact). 
•  Environmental effects. 
The directive also explicitly adds that the cross‐cutting criteria shall take into account the 
availability of alternatives and the duration of disruption/time for recovery of service. 
Although estimates on the number of casualties or potential for economic loss can be made, 
no direct method of quantifying public effects is known. Therefore a qualitative approach 
has been taken, whereby five different categories of impact are considered: 
•  Impact on Government services; 
•  Impact on public confidence; 
•  Impact on social order; 
•  Population impact; 
•  Geopolitical impact. 
 
It can be desirable to develop another approach for evaluation of impact of terrorist attacks 
on an individual or on the whole society, especially when a short‐term, long‐term, separate, 
or complex impact should be indicated. The bad consequences of a homeland security 
management failure are not only a big numbers of dead, a big property damage, or number 
of displaced people as was seen in the Katrina‐case, (Davis et al., 2007: 1‐7) but also 
consequences, e.g. a perceptible decline of public confidence in government or a significant 
decline of investor´s confidence causing a stampede of direct foreign investment, 
investment in stock, or investment in government bonds. These visible and invisible 
consequences can die down immediately but they normally do not. In this point of view a 
terrorist attack can be seen as a malicious injury of a society or a hard curable disease 
making the society weak. A terrorist attack is usually focused on “the state body” of a society 
which should inflict enormous damage on the state power. (Traverton&Jones, 2005) In our 
global world this is based on confidence of natural and corporate bodies dwelling on the 
state territory in the ruling government and its ability to ensure security needed for 
economical and social activities of these bodies on this territory, for economical and social 
development. (Benson&Clay, 2004) A terrorist attack inflicts short‐term or long‐term 
disabilities of social live in the attacked society. The disabilities can stretch from little ones, 
such as disappearing of litter bins out of public open spaces to minimize any opportunity for 
hiding of a bomb, to big ones. Such one can be e.g. a proclaiming martial law. 
 
Speaking about measuring disasters and terrorist attacks impact on the society and nation 
power, we should take three aspects into an account: (1) taxonomy of threats and risks, (2) 
visible damage such as causalities, damage to property, production losses, etc., and (3) 
disabilities of social life in the attacked society. Taxonomy of threats and risks is a well known part of the risk management. A consequence management, a part of crises 
management, (Larson&Peters, 2001: 257) focuses on the second aspect. These 
consequences can be measurable in a polygon chart. The extent of a disaster or terrorist 
attack can be measured by the area of the polygon.  
 
The approaches used to quantify the potential impacts of the specific threats are those that 
(similarly as in insurance) are using two basic variables: probability (likehood) of the threat 
(from the relatively common cases such as floods to rare incidents such as the fall of an 
asteroid or the eruption of a volcano and destructiveness (robustnes) of the consequences 
an event has (destructiveness may be perceived not only in terms of casualties, injuries, or 
estimated material loss, but also in terms of the impact the event has on the public’s 
psychology, people’s confidence in government etc.). (Benson; Clay, 2004: 50). As the 
auxiliary variable, the avoidability and/or removability, or as the case may be, the 
inavoidability and/or irremovability of the consequences (impacts) of the particular event 
may be used. (Horst; Pruyt, 2008: 18‐19). The focus of the activities of the most foreseeable 
crisis managers has to be concentrated on the most frequent and in the same way, the 
most destructive scenarios. To measure these aspects of a disaster or terrorist attack we 
should develop a new concept. This concept can be based on an analogy between a human 
body and human health and a social system, a national state, and its health. 
In this way, a conceptual framework for a classification of the consequences of threats could 
be alike the classification of functioning, disability and health of a human body. This 
classification is known as the World Health Organization’s The International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). The ICF is a classification of health and health related 
domains describing: body functions and structures, activities and participation, and 
environmental factors. The classification is used in a variety of areas and has specific 
applications in clinical diagnosis, rehabilitation assessment, and disability policy planning and 
survey research. The domains are classified from body, individual and societal perspectives. 
The ICF classification is organized in a hierarchical scheme. The components of Body 
Functions and Structure, Activities and Participation and Environmental Factors are classified 
independently. Within each component, the categories are arranged in a stem‐branch‐leaf 
scheme, so that a lower‐level category shares the attributes of the higher‐level categories of 
which it is a member. 
 
The ICF could become a suitable inspiration for European conceptual framework for 
classification threats, risks and events in view of their impact on state power, government, 
and society. This classification can be useful especially for security policy planning, survey 
research, and support communication within the European Union. There are two critical 
points of this classification: abundance of statistic records about events disturbing security 
and their impact on the society and mutual comparability states. That is not a problem of the 
ICF. Each human body is the same and since ancient regime has raised the number of 
medical records as much as necessary to be able to assess possibility of death or health 
consequences of an illness or a bad injury. It could be difficult in terrorist attack cases. The 
incidents in which the terrorists attack vary over the world. Should be the impact of a 
terrorist attack in the Czech Republic the same as in Spain living with organizations such as 
ETA or in Israel living with suicide bombers?  
 Conclusions 
Role of the European Union can be understood as a role of the player, that will alert the 
individual member states about the importance of individual security topics and/or avoid the 
depreciation of respective agendas (to be able to exert to get member states to address 
potential issues). (Pruyt, 2008: 18). The Union' security agenda in the area of the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime is highly incomprehensible. The issue of the fight 
against organised crime falls within the responsibility of MDG Working Group 
(Multidisciplinary Group) and the issue of combating terrorism is dealt with by TWG 
(Terrorism Working Group, 3
rd pillar) and COTER (2
nd pillar). Nevertheless, both agendas are 
cross‐cutting in such a manner that even the team of the Union' counterterrorism 
coordinator, established not so long ago, has not managed to obtain a detailed overview of 
all terrorism‐related issues that are being discussed. 
 
This is closely connected with the fact that both agendas (more or less in line with the 
concept of securitization) may be related to a wide range of other sectional issues. 
Organised crime, in particular, may involve issues such as trafficking of human beings, drug 
or arms trafficking, violation of intellectual property rights and many other economically‐
tinged offences including the money laundering, environmental crime, cross‐border 
smuggling of dangerous wastes etc. The agenda needs to be tackled by experts in law, 
sociology, economics, chemistry, ballistics, ethnology etc. This applies to terrorism as well. 
Only if we take a look into the documents like the European Counterterrorist (i.e. Action Plan 
of the Fight against Terrorism) or the Counter‐terrorism Compendium, it is obvious that this 
"sexy agenda" (Vico, 2004) is not manageable by a single expert or a group of a few. This 
area requires experts in international law, protection of critical infrastructure, diplomacy, 
international assistance providing, media strategies, arms trafficking, CBRN agents handling, 
migration tackling, public procurement contracting, semantics, interpretation of religious 
texts, economics, information and communication technologies etc.  
 
The European Union itself has silently dissolved the issue of terrorism towards a more 
generally conceived crisis and consequence management. This can be seen very 
illustratively on the difference between the first and second rounds of the Union's 
counterterrorist per evaluations. The first round, completed in 2005, largely dealt with the 
legal frameworks applicable in individual member states and also with the above‐mentioned 
police and intelligence cooperation and information sharing. The second round (started in 
April 2008), however, is wholly within the cognizance of experts focusing on crisis 
management and removing the consequences of "large‐scale disasters". All the above‐
stated points (at least as far as terrorism is concerned) also apply more or less on the 
particular national level of individual member states. The former fascination with terrorism 
is now gone. The pompous counterterrorist strategies are being gradually updated with 
more and more emphasis on the “all hazard” or “comprehensive approach”.  
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